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Abstract: In the incoming internet of things (IoT) applications, smart sensors expose services to interact with them, to be
parameterised, managed and maintained. Therefore, fine-grained end-to-end access control enforcement is mandatory to tackle
the derived security requirements. However, it is still not feasible in very constrained devices. There is an innovative access
control model that conveys an expressive policy language and an optimised codification for tight and flexible access control
enforcement in very constrained devices. Such tightness enabled by the expressiveness of the policy language leads to detailed
policy instances that might impact on the performance and therefore, in the feasibility and further applicability. In this context,
this study assesses how the policy length impacts the performance of the establishment of a security association through the
protocol named Hidra proposed by such an adapted access control model. Consequently, the notable results of the performance
evaluation prove the feasibility and adequacy of this access control model for the new smart IoT scenarios.
1 Introduction
In the advent of the internet of things (IoT), access control and
therefore security remains insufficiently solved in constrained
devices. Existing approaches lack the required expressiveness of
the policies to enforce fine-grained access control.
Regarding the security of IoT applications, two behaviours can
be distinguished in sensor networks, where sensors and actuators
are mainly expected to be cheap and constrained devices,
constrained device sensors (CDSs) from now on, with low
memory, low processor and usually relying on batteries. On the one
hand, sensors are commonly configured to measure their
environment and detect any significant change on it and then
communicate as clients to a message broker with the proper labels.
So in the communications between the sensors as producers and
the message broker, both endpoints have identified each other
previously and the security associations to assure confidentiality
and integrity of data are static and known beforehand. Then, the
message broker receives, normalises, relabels, routes and finally,
based on a security policy, may release or not the messages to the
final consumers identified as subscribers. Thus, this pushing
behaviour from the sensors to the final subscribers through the
aforementioned broker cannot be considered a direct end-to-end
(E2E) communication.
On the other hand, sensors are expected to behave also as
servers, and to offer end to end services to a priori unknown
subjects in order to behave smart or process adaptive in large-scale
deployments. In fact, the IoT concept envisions pervasive
computing environments where a larger number of people and
devices can discover and access services in things around them.
For example, smart environments such as smart homes, cars,
offices, elite sport training etc. consist of intelligent services on
resources that are accessible to users through handheld devices or
under bring your own device paradigm, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
Therefore, the offered services in constrained devices are
conceived to enable the tuning of a sporadic user experience, as
well as management and maintenance of the CDS itself in several
IoT domains. For example, in scenarios such as elite sport training
monitoring or healthcare, where the user's profile is used to
customise the sensibility and the identity in the CDS that uploads
the monitored activity and health parameters.
Alternatively, in such smart scenarios, Industry 4.0 stands for
the smartness of the assets [1] through information and
communication technologies. The key aspect is the set of offered
services equivalent to a remote administration. These services
enable usage, operation, maintenance, and manageability in the life
cycle and value stream of the connected things. Even more, there is
an initiative called the web of things (WoT), which aims to evolve
to wisdom WoT, to support smart web services [2].
The aforementioned maintenance and manageability features in
a CDS are extensible to any IoT application sector and very
demanded in multi-stakeholder scenarios where owners,
manufacturers, integrators, developers, operators and service
supporters stand for the service chain, and the operational cost
(Opex) optimisation is a key objective. In fact, services on the CDS
enable the tuning of the operation after commissioning, such as
domain parameterisation, networking operation, functionality
adaptation or extension, customisation (sensibility, accuracy,
threshold, peering, periodicity etc.) or maintenance. For example,
the scenarios where maintenance involves several parties and
responsibilities, illustrate the opportunity and the criticism of the
protection and nominal accounting of the exposed management
services in the CDS.
The basic actors in the access control schema depicted in Fig. 1
are three: a subject (i), constrained or not, aiming to access a
management or parameterisation service as a resource in a CDS
(ii), with the collaboration of a trusted third party in a security
association establishment step, namely the access control server
(ACS) (iii). Usually, ACS and subject are not challenged by
resource scarcity as in the case of CDSs, so they are in the less
constrained level. However, CDSs that expose any service, need to
tackle functional and security requirements with low memory, low
processing capabilities, and very often relying on batteries.
Concretely, the Internet Engineering Task Force defines ranges of
constrained devices [3], as class 0 (C0, <10 KiB of data size, <100 
KiB of code size), class 1 (C1, 10 and 100 KiB, respectively) and
class 2 (C2, 50 and 250 KiB), which are expected to be massively
deployed and accessible in different applications.
In such open and dynamic applications, E2E policy based
security is required to be enforced locally in the CDSs [4]. In fact,
using security policies allows the security objectives to be tightly
enforced and modified without changing the implementation of the
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involved entities. A policy language in this type of environment
needs to be very expressive but lightweight and easily extensible.
A survey on the proposed security solutions for constrained
devices summarised in Section 2, reflects a lack of adequacy and
poor performance of access control security and activity tracking,
due to the cost in power, communications and processor (CPU) that
security mechanisms require. The expressiveness of currently
feasible access control policies is very limited, while usually
adopted access control list (ACL) approach is not scalable for E2E
security in open scenarios. In fact, in the envisioned scenarios the
number of potentially authorised subjects is high and unknown,
and ACL-based access control means a big unaffordable storage in
the CDS as analysed later in Section 3.2 as well as network
overloading and energy consumption due to ACL updating tasks.
Given this background, there is an innovative access control
model [5] that deals with a hybrid architecture and an expressive
policy language for dynamic fine-grained policy enforcement in
the sensor. This least privilege oriented enforcement is based on
local context conditions and correspondent obligations, not only
during secure session establishment but also afterwards while the
security association is in use, in order to control the behaviour of
the access. Such a dynamic policy cycle avoiding local storage
requires an efficient message exchange protocol, named Hidra, in
order to assure the mutual authentication, the expressive policy
injection, the tight policy enforcement in the secure association
establishment and the derived resource access, as well as the
accounting for further tracking and auditing purposes.
In this context, this study assesses the impact on the
performance of the tightness enabled by such an expressive policy
language. This policy language supports fine-grained policies
aiming at the least privilege principle enforcement but needs to
tackle the challenges derived from the resource scarcity of the
CDSs in order to guarantee its feasibility and consequent
applicability.
Henceforth, the related work will be presented in Section 2 as
the state of the art; the assessed access control model is briefly
described in Section 3 for an easier exposition of the impact
analysis of the policy length, covering (i) the policy language, (ii)
the policy codification, (iii) the policy domain model, (iv) the
architecture and the Hidra message protocol; the impact of the
tightness on the performance is evaluated in Section 4; finally, the
main conclusions of the paper are gathered in Section 5.
2 State of the art
In the last few years, the research area related to security in IoT has
received a significant attention, dealing with the design of different
architectures, security protocols and policy models. However,
security still remains the main obstacle in the development of
innovative and valuable services [6]. In fact, traditional security
countermeasures cannot be applied directly to CDSs in IoT
scenarios, because they are too resource consuming and not
optimised for resource deprived devices. Additionally, existing
feasible E2E access control approaches do not implement an
expressive and therefore fine-grained and tight security policy
enforcement [7].
For feasibility reasons, a centralised architecture based on
traditional standards and protocols, where a central server with no
resource constraints makes authorisation decisions for each access
request, could be initially an examined option. However, this
approach does not consider local context conditions in CDSs, and it
implies high-energy consumption as well as network overhead due
to continuous communications between the CDSs and the ACS.
For the local access control enforcement in the CDSs, instead of
security rules coupled within the applications’ logic, policy driven
security management and enforcement have become the de facto
approach in large-scale systems. In this regard, the tightness of the
enforcement is enabled by the expressiveness of the relying policy
language.
From the analysis of the most expressive foundational policy
languages [8–10], Table 1 shows the main features that are
conditions, obligations and re-evaluation. All of them support the
if–then or condition–action paradigm with different attribute
treatment. However, none of them is optimised for constrained
devices, and consequently, they are not feasible in CDSs. 
As representative by its level of adoption, extensible accessible
control markup language (XACML) [11] relies on a generic
authorisation architecture and specifies a complete and sound
policy language to express and exchange authorisation policies
represented in XML. However, XACML is too heavy for severely
constrained devices. In fact, a CDS can hardly process an XACML
Fig. 1  IoT applications support smart environments such as healthcare, elder care, cities, offices, logistics, transport, cars, elite sports etc. involving several
roles which aim to access sensors in order to tune them through an effective but feasible access control schema
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policy file of more than 50 lines of text conveying a single rule
specification.
A recent alternative approach is the distributed capability based
access control (DcapBAC) [12], where an unforgeable token
exchangeable as a capability, grants access to its holder in a more
agile way. However, the token is designed in an XML schema and
it has not been validated in constrained devices.
In any case, this approach has been adopted by some other
designs involving technologies specifically defined for IoT, which
enable CDSs to make local authorisation decisions based also on
local conditions [13], since the capabilities might include
conditions represented as tuples (type, name, value). Per contra,
this approach is based on public key cryptography (PKC), which is
heavier than symmetric key cryptography (SKC) by means of
resource consumption. Additionally, the conditions are limited to
matching because the approach does not support expressions, its
syntax is not optimised by means of codification since it uses
JSON, it does not support the enforcement of additional obligations
and it has been validated in not so constrained C2 CDSs.
In this line, the delegated CoAP [14] authentication and
authorisation framework [15] defines a token to distribute pre-
shared keys, and if authorised, a handshake is done to establish a
datagram transport layer security channel. Local authorisation
policies are specified as conditions serialised in a concise binary
representation (CBOR), instead of JSON, aiming at compacted
payloads in CoAP protocol. However, CBOR is a general purpose
serialisation solution and the resulting compression is not
sufficiently optimised for security policies in very constrained C0
and C1 CDSs, where fine-grained access control is aimed through a
higher but feasible policy language expressiveness, beyond the
existing local attributes matching as conditions.
In another line, the usage control model (UCON) [16] and the
attribute-based policy schema [17] extend traditional access control
systems to a continuous protection of the resource during access by
the definition of obligations to enforce usage control, but there is
no approach addressing the feasibility in CDSs.
Attending to the protocols for the instant provisioning of the
policy during the E2E security association in a secure session,
Ladon [18], which is inspired in Kerberos that was designed for
non-constrained scenarios, has been evolved for that purpose. In
fact, Ladon is specifically designed for very constrained C0 and C1
devices, but it does not directly support the provisioning of an
expressive policy.
Hidra protocol conveyed in the assessed access control model
[5] evolves Ladon to enable the dynamic provisioning of
expressive policy instances as well as accounting. In fact, currently
no other suitable solution exists to provide authentication and fine-
grained authorisation processes in the envisioned scenarios of
constrained but manageable sensor networks, and additionally,
neither of the above-considered approaches implements any
accounting feature.
Hidra allows conveying a highly expressive policy language,
which is ready to define detailed policy instances that consist of
rules with conditions based on expressions beyond the simple
matching of attribute values. For example, checking the battery
level in a range, a counter below a threshold, or a change in a status
variable result much more expressive than checking specific static
values. Additionally, the policy language allows both re-evaluation
and obligations. In fact, feasible approaches used so far do not
support the definition of different rules related to specific actions
on a resource. If the action extends on time, the approaches
implemented thus far do not support a way to re-evaluate the rule
and perform a usage control, or simply to check if the local context
conditions remaining in proper status. Neither is there a way to run
any additional task, called obligation, as the reaction to a rule
evaluation, and therefore, features such as updating of counters for
activity control, locking of data for transaction management etc.
that are required for tighter and smarter enforcement are not solved
by the approaches implemented until now.
These features of the policy language such as (i) granular rules
based on expressive functions as conditions over the subject,
resource, action, and context attributes, (ii) reactive obligations and
(iii) usage control oriented re-evaluation in a lightweight way,
which are related to Hidra are shown in Table 1.
In any case, this access control model that has been initially
validated for C0 CDSs with a simple policy instance requires an
assessment of the impact of the expressiveness (and related
tightness) of the policy instances on the performance in order to
deeply evaluate its feasibility and further applicability.
Finally, the most recent access control related proposals, still far
from the required expressiveness, have been validated in C2 CDSs
with minimal policy instances, and their feasibility has not been
validated in C0 and C1 CDSs. There is no such assessment for the
aforementioned access control models and protocols.
3 Access control model
Hereinafter a brief description of the access control model under
evaluation is presented for a better understanding of the assessment
of the impact of the expressiveness of the policy instances on the
performance. A detailed description of the access control model
can be found in [5].
Summarily, the assessed E2E access control model is based on
an efficient policy language and codification, which are
specifically defined to gain expressiveness in the authorisation
policies and to keep the viability in very constrained C0 and C1
devices. Besides the policy language, the access control model
conveys the E2E feasible security association between two
mutually authenticated peers and consists of an architecture to
enable multi-step authorisation as well as a protocol for the
provisioning and enforcement of a dynamic security policy in the
CDSs.
3.1 Authorisation policy language
In this section, the expressive policy language detailed in [5] is
summarised. The goal of this policy language is to enable the
enforcement of tighter access control policies in CDSs, overcoming
the resource constraints. In fact, this policy language definition
enables both to make granting decisions based on local context
conditions and to react accordingly to the requests by the execution
of additional tasks defined as obligations.
Table 1 Summarised overview of foundational policy languages
Conditions Obligations Re-evaluation
Role matching Attribute matching Expressive functions
XACML x x x x
Rei x x x x
Ponder x x x x
ASL x
OSL x x x
APPEL x
EPAL x
CapBAC x
UCON x x x
Hidra x x x x x
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A resulting policy instance is defined, like in the general event-
condition-action approaches, as an optional set of rules, which
specifies both the conditions to be checked and the related
reactions, in enforcement time. Specifically, this policy language
stands for a sequence of constructs with a particular meaning in the
decision making and enforcement time.
Some of the constructs are defined as mandatory, and some
others as optional, enabling to shorten the length of the policy
when a simple policy is enough. Additionally, some constructs are
extended through other nested constructs, and some of them can be
instantiated many times within a container construct. Related to
this elasticity feature, the more constructs, the higher the
expressiveness of the policy, so the more granular the policy is, and
thereupon the tighter the enforcement is. Consequently, the
challenge to overcome is to be feasible even in the most expressive
use-case.
The policy language enables a policy instantiation through the
policy construct, with three nested constructs as depicted in Fig. 2. 
First of all, a policy instance identification, id, is specified for
logging, tracking and auditing purposes. Then, a default policy
granting effect is specified. This effect will prevail in the case of
absence of rules, or any rule evaluation conflict. This construct is
very useful in most simple policy instances, with no rules, where
authentication or preliminary authorisation in the ACS is condition
enough to grant access in a request. It is also useful for notifying
revocation and related security association finalisation. Lastly,
optionally, an array of rules may be instantiated as a ruleset to
specify the conditions and related reactions. Each rule in the array
is an extendible construct.
The rule construct is defined as a sequence of eight nested
constructs, where the order is crucial. Some of them, such as id,
effect, and conditionset are mandatory, and the rest named
periodicity, iteration, resource, action, and obligationset are
optional. In fact, periodicity and iteration are used to specify policy
re-evaluation timing and repetitions, respectively. Moreover, the
granularity of the policy aiming at least privilege enforcement is
enabled by the optional specification of resources and actions.
Concretely, they enable to trigger tighter rules to be triggered
depending on the request.
The conditionset and obligationset are arrays of expressions and
obligations, respectively. These repeatable and extensible
expression and obligation constructs are defined in a similar way
enabling the instantiation of rich expressions on attributes declared
as inputs as well as reactive tasks declared as obligations.
This policy language is highly inspired in XACML as
representative by its level of adoption, and it adapts the most
significant constructs. The number and meaning of the constructs
in the policy language result from the compromise between
expressiveness and performance. In fact, as an approximation to a
coarse completeness and soundness overview, the proposed
constructs enable the full set of features mentioned in Section 2.
Such features are (i) granular rules based on expressive functions
as conditions over the subject, resource, action, and context
attributes, (ii) reactive obligations and (iii) usage control oriented
re-evaluation in a lightweight way, as shown in Table 1.
This policy language can be used to implement the most
extended access control models, i.e. role-based access control and
attribute-based access control (ABAC) models, using the same set
of constructs in different domains, which leads to simpler policy
instances, and more uniformity.
3.2 Policy language codification
This section summarises the codification of the policy instances
that notably reduces the length of the policy file. The length of any
policy instance, in a human readable format, grows proportionally
with the aimed tightness, and it would impact negatively on the
performance. So a policy instance codification is proposed,
distinguishing from existing ones that serialise policy instances
through standardised generalist solutions such as CBOR. Existing
serialisation approaches do not optimise the agreed common
understanding of the constructs by means of their sequence,
meaning, type, scope nor elasticity. Consequently, the compression
ratios of currently available approaches remaining lower than the
one resulting from the policy codification proposed in this section.
The proposed policy codification serialises each construct and
concatenates them in a bit stream. In fact, it takes profit of
beforehand knowledge of the defined sequence of the constructs,
and their format. An additional crucial factor is an injection of (i)
some agreed bit masks, to specify the existence or not of optional
constructs and (ii) some related array length bits. It enables to deal
optimally with the elasticity defined in the policy language,
avoiding unused but expected fields of expressive policies, greatly
reducing the length. In the CDS side, the de-codification and
enforcement are based on the same principle of beforehand
construct sequence knowledge as well as the shared semantics for
the injected bit masks and array lengths as detailed in [5].
Fig. 2  Authorisation policy language main constructs
(a) Policy construct definition, (b) Rule construct definition
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With respect to covered policy formats, this authorisation policy
binary representation (APBR) can easily be applied to any original
policy instance format (XACML, JSON etc.), from textual files to
structured policy instance representations. For example, four
different policy instances of the sample (IS) explained after in the
performance evaluation section, can be represented in JSON with
lengths of 23, 118, 174, and 554 bytes. They can also be codified in
CBOR with lengths of 14, 81, 123, and 391 bytes, respectively, and
they are notably reduced to 2, 7, 9, and 32 bytes using the proposed
codification, as shown in Table 2. 
At this point, it is worthy to examine traditional ACLs so
broadly adopted in closed scenarios, where each resource has
defined a set of subjects and related permissions. One accepted
implementation is to define such permissions per resource based on
roles. This approach could be codified as the simplest read-write-
execute (RWX) for each role (Rli) per resource (Ri), RWX(Rli, Ri),
in a byte per resource. This implies to keep also a subject index
table as well as a subject-role mapping table if nominal access
control is to be enforced.
So in a use case of eight subjects with three roles accessing four
resources with three actions, the corresponding ACL codification
would result in 68 bytes as shown in Table 3. In a similar way,
doubling resources could be codified with 72 bytes. However,
when the number of subjects rises to 32, 64, 128 or 256 the
codification of the ACL implies 264, 520, 1032 and 2056 bytes,
respectively. 
On the other hand, ACLs result rather static compared with the
policies instantiated and codified with the assessed policy
language, which enclose as many rules as resources to cover the
most stressing case. To compare, the evaluated APBR codification
of the same use cases would imply policy instances of four and
eight rules (IS4Rules, IS8Rules) codified constantly with 8 and 13
bytes whatever is the number of subjects, roles and actions over the
resources.
Besides enforcement based on ACLs is far from being flexible
and it does not consider local context nor enables to launch any
reactive obligation. Additionally, the length of the ACLs notably
grows and it scales unacceptable when the number of subjects rises
moderately compared with the expected widespread increase of
potential subjects in the envisioned open scenarios. Instead, the
length of the policy instances with the proposed policy language
and codification remains constantly low independent of the subject
number, as shown in Table 3.
3.3 Policy domain model
The policy domain model (PDM) defines the assumptions that are
useful to modulate the length in a trade-off with the expressiveness.
These assumptions are related to the possible values in a construct,
the repetitiveness of sub-constructs as the lengths of the arrays, or
their reference through identifiers pointing to attributes, functions,
resources etc.
This PDM consists of the detailed definition of the policy
language (in grey) and the adopted conventions (in different
colours), as denoted in Fig. 3. 
The PDM definition enables different gradual implementations
that could be patterned as it is done nowadays by most CDS
implementations. When the PDM is specified through decoupled
files, their edition, modification, provisioning, and activation is
much more agile. Through the decoupled PDM specification file,
better abstraction, higher scalability, and flexibility as well as
multi-domain applicability are obtained, namely access control
model manageability in the CDS.
3.4 Hidra messaging protocol
To efficiently convey the aforementioned access control policies to
the CDSs, Hidra messaging protocol is defined in [5], and briefly
described hereinafter. Hidra, depicted in Fig. 4, is based on three
parties architecture and provides authentication, authorisation in
two steps, dynamic policy provisioning, and accounting. 
Hidra is based on Ladon [18], which is a validated solution for
the establishment of E2E security associations, through pair-wise
Table 2 Length comparison for different representations of four instances
Representation Nature Length (bytes)
IS1 IS2 IS3 IS4
JSON human-readable text 30 164 236 798
JSON’ pre-processed text 23 118 174 554
CBOR binary stream 14 81 123 391
APBR optimised binary stream 2 7 9 32
 
Table 3 Length comparison for different representations of four instances
Use case Resources Roles Subjects APBR ACL
Policy instance Bytes Stored policy Bytes
UC1 4 3 8 IS4Rules RWX(Rli, Ri) 4
subject-role mapping 24
subject index 40
8 68
UC2 8 3 8 IS8Rules 13 || 72
UC3 8 3 32 IS8Rules 13 || 264
UC4 8 3 64 IS8Rules 13 || 520
UC5 8 3 128 IS8Rules 13 || 1032
UC6 8 3 256 IS8Rules 13 || 2056
 
Fig. 3  PDM conveying the constructs of policy language and the reference
indexes specifying additional domain-related conventions
 
IET Inf. Secur., 2019, Vol. 13 Iss. 3, pp. 239-248
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
243
keys, guaranteeing mutual authentication and authorisation in very
CDSs.
Hidra is based on SKC and it assumes that each endpoint owns
a secret key shared with the ACS. The operation is based on the
use of tickets, a capability distributed by the ACS that contains a
proof of the identity of the subject that requests it. Tickets are
encrypted so that only the entities which they are intended for, are
able to decrypt them.
After a successful authentication in the ACS (phase 1) the
subject obtains a ticket granting ticket (TGT). This TGT is used by
the subject to obtain resource tickets (phase 2) required to access
any resource on the CDSs.
This approach enables the ABAC authorisation enforcement in
two steps. On the first one, as a condition to release any resource
ticket, fine-grained preliminary access control is performed in the
ACS (phase 2), focusing on the attributes of the subject, resource,
and expected actions. If this first authorisation step is successful,
the ACS sends a message to the subject including a resource ticket
and a message to the CDS conveying an expressive authorisation
policy instance. This instantaneous custom policy provisioning is
innovative and advantageous since it avoids permanent policies’
storage in the CDS and reduces network overhead. In fact,
typically, policies might be enclosed in the resource ticket such as
in Ladon and DcapBAC. However, such an approach implies
increasing the length of the ticket, which is a long structure by
itself and can result in packet fragmentation, and therefore,
additional network overload, due to the short available payloads of
IEEE 802.15.4 frames. Therefore, Hidra takes advantage of the
HID_CM_IND message to efficiently convey the access control
policy to the CDS.
On the second authoritative step, once the subject has obtained
a resource ticket, the local context-based access control is
performed in the CDS (phase 3). First, the proper fine grained rule
is evaluated to make the granting decision, and then the
corresponding reactive actions are enforced. In a positive case, the
result is (i) the establishment of a session key to be used on further
E2E resource access exchanges as any security association protocol
and (ii) a cutting-edge fresh policy provisioning that is custom and
very granular, and which is enforced during the security
association.
Another novelty with respect to any security protocol is the
addition of a pair of messages to enable precise accounting (phase
4). By means of these messages, the CDS will notify details like
who performed what, where and when in each and every access
request received from the subject. These notifications are gathered,
normalised, and treated properly by the ACS. Additionally, the
ACS can react and send a HID_CM_IND message with a fresh
policy instance, enabling the dynamic delegation, request,
cancellation, and revocation of permissions.
Then, while the security association is not finalised, the access
control is enforced and accounted in the CDS autonomously in
each and every further request attempt, since the received
expressive fresh policy (phase 2) includes also related rules. In this
specific aspect, Hidra enables local context policy based access
control enforcement with maximum granularity and minimum
policy storage and footprint compared with static generic policy
based approaches.
Consequently, besides a tight and continuous local context
based enforcement, a unified, coherent and adaptive management
of the policies by the ACS is achieved. These two main features are
not covered this way by any other security association
establishment protocol nowadays. Additionally, the Hidra protocol
and the adopted architecture enable to rely the most expensive
features on the ACS, which entails the usage of standard security
and access control technologies in the non-constrained interactions.
It also achieves that most unauthorised access attempts are refused
before reaching the CDS, avoiding unsuccessful message
exchanges and thus, saving energy in the CDS, which is a crucial
aspect.
4 Performance evaluation
The analytical performance evaluation described here focuses on
the impact of the length of the policy on two critical parameters for
the envisioned scenarios: (i) the delay introduced by the access
control model for an authorised E2E secure session establishment
and (ii) the energy cost on the CDS's battery of such secure session
establishment. The delay needs to be under an accepted value and
the energy consumption cannot exceed a rationale and proportional
limit.
Fig. 4  Hidra protocol messages and security association establishment related authentication, authorisation, key exchange and notifications
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The reference scenario for the performance evaluation is
depicted in Fig. 4. In this scenario, a subject is connected to the
Internet and establishes an E2E connection with a resource running
on a CDS in an IEEE 802.15.4 network. A 6LoWPAN [19] router
in orange, acts as the LowPAN coordinator and connects a beacon-
enabled cluster-tree structure to the Internet. The IEEE 802.15.4
network is three-hops deep, which is considered significantly large
for validation. The PAN router coordinator has three child
coordinators, which have another three child coordinators each,
controlling a cluster of six leaf nodes where each CDS exposes
resources as management services. Therefore, 54 (3 × 3 × 6) CDSs
are integrated into the network, but details of the branches have
been omitted for the clarity of the picture.
4.1 Time computation
For the computation of the E2E secure session establishment time,
four contributions are considered for each of the messages
exchanged in Hidra: the time to generate the message in the origin,
the network transmission time, the queue waiting time in the
destination, and the time to process the received message.
In the computation of the generation and processing time, the
execution of the cryptographic operations is the most significant
ones, and the rest of the operations are comparatively negligible. In
fact, among the cryptographic functions two different constant bit
rates are considered for encryption and MAC computation, and it
implies that the length of the messages impacts directly on the
computation of this time.
Equation (1) shows the calculation of the service time as
encryption time, related to the message i in the entity X, which is
computed based on aforementioned two terms, namely
CRYP(Messagei) , which represents the number of bytes of the
fields in the message i that are subject to cryptographic operations
and TCRYPX, which denotes the constant bit rate as bit/s for
encryption functions in the corresponding entity X
SXi =
CRYP(Messagei)
TCRYPX
. (1)
In the case of the computation of the transmission time, backoff
delay (DBOT), which depends on the network density and has been
computed following the model in [20], and propagation delay
(DTx), which depends on the length of each message Messagei , are
considered. Equation (2) shows the calculation of the transmission
time in each of the three hops of the evaluation scenario (D1, D2,
D3), where a constant propagation rate (R) in kbps is considered
for all the IEEE 802.15.4 links
Dl = DBOTl + DTxl , for l = 1, 2, 3, (2)
where
DTxl =
Messagei
R . (3)
So, the total transmission time is calculated as
E[ti] = D1 + D2 + D3 . (4)
Related to the queue waiting time, each entity is modelled as an
M/G/1 queue, Hidra related messages are only considered and
subjects generate requests according to a Poisson distribution.
Therefore, considering the resource utilisation as ρ = λX, the
random variable for service time of job i as Xi, and the second
moment of service time as X2 = E[Xi2], the average waiting time in
the queue for each entity is computed according to Pollaczek–
Khinchin mean formula [21], as
W = λX
2
2(1 − ρ) . (5)
4.2 Energy computation
For the computation of the energy cost in the CDS, the energy
consumed by communications, namely transmission or reception of
Hidra messages as bits over the air, as well as the computation of
cryptographic operations are considered.
Equation (6) shows the calculation of the energy consumption
by the communications in the reception of a message in the CDS X,
based on the energy consumed to receive a message i (εRx), where
PRx denotes a constant reception power consumption and R denotes
a constant wireless link data rate in the LoWPAN network
εX = εRx =
Messagei
R PRx . (6)
Additionally, the energy consumed during the backoff process is
also considered for the transmission. Consequently, (7) shows the
calculation of the energy consumption by the communications in
the transmission of a message in the CDS X, based on the energy
consumed during the backoff processes (εBOT) computed following
the model in [20] and the energy consumed to transmit a message
(εTx), where PTx denotes a constant transmission power
consumption
εX = εBOT + εTx, (7)
where
εTx =
Messagei
R PTx . (8)
Related to cryptographic operations involved in the generation and
processing of the messages in the CDS, two different constant bit
rates are considered for encryption and MAC computation.
Equation (9) shows the calculation related to the message i in the
entity X, which is computed based on the length of the fields
subject to cryptographic operations ( CRYP(Messagei) ), and the
cryptographic operation rate TCRYPX, considering a constant
instantaneous power consumption (PC) for the computation
εXi =
CRYP(Messagei)
TCRYPX
PC . (9)
4.3 Analysis scenario
In the aforementioned reference scenario depicted in Fig. 4, a
subject is connected to the Internet and establishes an E2E
connection with a resource running on a CDS in an IEEE 802.15.4
network of 54 nodes, which is three hops deep. The considered
effective data bit rate is of 70 kbps, so the scenario network is
significantly large and stressed for validation purposes.
Regarding message exchange, queuing theory is considered,
where each security association request generates a new job in the
queue, and the most demanding case of a request per hour has been
considered. This demanding rate could be the case of a CDS that is
tuned for a better user experience with several user parameters, e.g.
physiological parameters in an elite training monitoring scenario.
This case can be considered more demanding compared with either
management or maintenance tasks, which are much more sporadic.
The key performance factor is the length of the policy since it
impacts proportionally on the delay, the energy consumption, and
therefore in the feasibility.
Since the provisioned policy is elastic, four samples have been
defined for the analysis of Hidra:
• Sample 1, a policy with no rules and comparable in
expressiveness with Ladon, validated in C0 CDSs [22]. That
could be the case of the access granted to a subject initially
authenticated and authorised in the ACS, and then just
authenticated in the CDS.
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• Sample 2, a policy with one rule with conditions, slightly
comparable in expressiveness to existing DcapBAC approaches
based on PKC and CBOR codification of the policy, which are
validated in not so constrained devices (C2 CDSs). In fact, the
proposed approach enables rich expressions on attributes,
instead of the simple matching of DcapBAC. For example,
beyond the initial authorisation in the ACS and local
authentication in the CDS, access for any maintenance action is
only granted after checking that battery level is greater than a
given threshold.
• Sample 3, a policy with one rule with conditions and
obligations, which is beyond the other existing feasible solutions
in expressiveness and tightness of the enforcement. For
example, after checking local conditions such as battery status,
while granting any maintenance action, the system status flag or
semaphore is updated accordingly as reaction enabled by
obligations.
• Sample 4, a policy with two rules with conditions, obligations
and periodical re-evaluation, which is far beyond the other
existing feasible solutions. This sample 4 incrementally covers
the checking of different conditions related to different actions
on different resources such as system status attributes checking
before maintenance actions and attempts counter checking
before administration granting, which both point out a bigger
granularity. Additionally, each of the accesses may produce
particular reactions as obligations such as system flags updating
enabling transactional controls, counters updating enabling
usage controls, or concrete remote notifications enabling instant
awareness. Also, finally, both rules can be re-checked after a
while to see on the one hand, whether system flags or activity
counters remain under accepted values to preserve granted
rights, or on the other hand, whether the policy has been
updated, e.g. revoking any previous right due to an anomalous
behaviour notification.
For such usable samples, the length of specific policy instances
varies depending on specific field values and iterations of nested
constructs. For each of the four samples, exemplary policy
instances (ISi) have been considered in order to calculate specific
lengths as shown in Table 4. Additionally, Table 5 shows the
message lengths of the Hidra protocol computed with the four
policy instances enclosed in the HID_CM_IND message, as well as
the lengths of the fields that are subject to cryptographic
operations, encryption as well as MAC computation in the CDS.
Message composition and lengths per field are detailed in [5]. 
4.4 Performance analysis
Currently, there is no approach validated for C0 and C1 CDSs in the
literature which equals Hidra in expressiveness and functionality,
both in enforcement and accounting. Instead, existing alternatives
have been validated for C2 CDSs, which are more powerful devices
with bigger batteries. In any case, there is no comparable
performance analysis based on the tightness of the enforcement if
not Ladon, which also enables the establishment of an
authenticated and centrally authorised security association and
could be comparable to sample 1 of Hidra.
In this performance analysis, the impact of the policy length on
the performance of Hidra with different samples is assessed.
Table 6 shows the reference parameters including power
consumptions corresponding to a MEMSIC TelosB mote
(TPR2420CA) [23]. Such parameters have been considered to
compute both the average delay and the energy consumption
conveyed in Fig. 5 in the establishment of a security association,
according to (4) and (9) computed on messages [1–9] detailed in
Table 5. 
Attending to the delay, the length of the four samples impacts
proportionally rising up to 145 ms in the most common samples 1–
4. Logically, the functionally comparable IS1 delay is very similar
to Ladon since innovative accounting messages are posterior to the
session establishment response message to the user and do not
affect the delay experienced by the user. In all cases, the delay is
under the ITU-T Y.1541 limit of 400 ms for E2E delay of
interactive transactions and the maximum allowed E2E delay
noticeable by users in traditional IP applications, which is 1000 ms.
Considering the high improvement in the control features, the
delay related to the most usable policy instances [IS1, IS4] remains
under 160 ms, which is acceptable according to even the maximum
acceptable value of 1000 ms assessed by Stallings [24] as good
quality for the response time of interactive go and back
applications.
Attending to the energy consumption, measurements point out
that the impact on energy consumption introduced due to a secure
session establishment using Hidra with four different policy
samples keeps proportional to the policy length. The measured
energy consumption rises up to 3.8 mJ, which is really low
compared with battery capacities around the 5940 J (the millionth
part), and considering the big improvement in the control features,
the impact remains more than acceptable. Logically, the addition of
Table 4 Codification lengths of four instances of samples
Sample Instance of sample (IS) and description Length
Bits Bytes
1 IS1: no rules, just policy id. (for tracking) and
granting effect
10 2
2 IS2: one rule with one condition with one input 53 7
3 IS3: one rule with one condition and one
obligation
67 9
4 IS4: two rules with three conditions and one
obligation, and periodical re-evaluation during
access session
258 32
 
Table 5 Lengths of Hidra protocol messages with four
different samples
Message type Length,
bytes
Subject to cryptographic
operations
Encryption,
bytes
MAC, bytes
HID_ACS.ASN_REQ 15 — —
HID_ACS.ASN_REP 62 — —
HID_CM_REQ 47 — —
HID_CM_IND 35/40/42/65 2/7/9/32 29/34/36/59
HID_CM_IND REQ 14 — 10
HID_CM_IND REP 22 — 26
HID_CM_REP 62 — —
HID_S_R_REQ 60 52 —
HID_S_R_REP 32 32 —
HID_R_IND 26 24 —
HID_R_ACK 14 — 10
 
Table 6 Parameters used to define the operation of the
Hidra protocol
Parameter Description Value
TCRYPS subject encryption rate 50 Mbps
TCRYPR resource encryption rate 50 Kbps
TMACR resource MAC computation rate 250 Kbps
TCRYPACS ACS encryption rate 100 Mbps
TMACACS ACS MAC computation rate 200 Mbps
λ0 mean job generation rate 1 request/h
NR number of resources 54
NS number of subjects 1
B effective wireless link data bit rate 70 kbps
PRX power consumption in reception mode 74.4 mW
PTX power consumption in transmission mode
(0 dBm)
65.7 mW
PC power consumption in cryptographic
processing mode
5.4 mW
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accounting features compared with Ladon implies the exchange of
two additional messages and therefore, a rise in energy
consumption but always under acceptable values.
5 Conclusion
Incoming smart scenarios enabled by IoT envision smart objects
exposing services to be adapted to user experience or to be
managed to aim at higher productivity, often in multi-stakeholder
applications. In such environments, smart things are cheap,
therefore constrained devices, but critical components, so security
is a must. Existent approaches do not cope with the principle of
least privilege since they lack expressiveness and updating of the
policy to be enforced in the CDSs, as well as additional control
through obligations or accounting.
There is an innovative access control model that deals with a
hybrid architecture and an expressive policy language for dynamic
fine-grained policy enforcement in the sensor. This least privilege
oriented enforcement is based on local context conditions and
corresponding obligations, not only during secure session
establishment but also afterwards while the security association is
in use, in order to control the behaviour of the access. Such a
dynamic policy cycle avoiding local storage requires an efficient
message exchange protocol, named Hidra, in order to assure the
mutual authentication, the expressive policy injection, the tight
policy enforcement in the secure association establishment and the
derived resource access, as well as the accounting for further
tracking and auditing purposes.
Considering the challenge of the feasibility unsolved by the
existing fine-grained access control models, the tightness of the
enforcement is a trade-off with the expressiveness of the policy
instances. The key performance factor is the length of the policy
instance, since it impacts proportionally on the delay, the energy
consumption, and therefore, in the feasibility. Since the analysed
policy language is elastic, four samples of incremental tightness are
instantiated. Such policy instances are provisioned on a CDS
through the Hidra security protocol over an 802.15.4 network of
three hops deep and 54 CDSs, which is parameterised with current
C0 and C1 capabilities and empirical network data rates. In this
realistic and stressing scenario, the resulting impact rises
proportionally to the length of the policy but always under
acceptable values.
Therefore, the assessed access control model is the first
approach to bring to C0 and C1 CDSs a similar expressiveness level
for enforcement and accounting as in the current Internet. The
positive performance evaluation concludes the feasibility and
suitability of this access control model, which notably rises the
security features on the CDSs for the incoming smart scenarios.
Finally, there is no comparable impact assessment of policy
expressiveness of any other access control model and presented the
analysis model, as well as results, might be a reference for further
analysis and benchmarking.
6 Acknowledgments
Part of this work is funded by the Department of Economic
Development and Competitiveness of the Basque Government
through the SEKUrtasun TEKnologiak SEKUTEK
KK-2017/00044 collaborative research project and by the Spanish
Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through the
State Secretariat for Research, Development and Innovation under
the ‘Adaptive Management of 5G Services to Support Critical
Events in Cities (5G-City)’ project TEC2016-76795-C6-5-R.
7 References
[1] Lee, J., Bagheri, B., Kao, H.-A.: ‘A cyber-physical systems architecture for
industry 4.0-based manufacturing systems’, Manuf. Lett., 2015, 3, pp. 18–23
[2] Zhong, N., Ma, J.H., Huang, R.H., et al.: ‘Research challenges and
perspectives on wisdom web of things (W2T)’, J. Supercomput., 2010, 64,
(3), pp. 862–882
[3] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., Keranen, A.: ‘Terminology for constrained-node
networks’, RFC 7228 (RFC Editor, 2014) Available at http://
www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc7228.txt, accessed 19 December 2016
[4] Roman, R., Zhou, J., Lopez, J.: ‘On the features and challenges of security
and privacy in distributed internet of things’, Comput. Netw., 2013, 57, (10),
pp. 2266–2279
[5] Uriarte, M., Astorga, J., Jacob, E., et al.: ‘Expressive policy based access
control for resource-constrained devices’, IEEE Access, 2017, PP, (99), pp.
1–1
[6] Sicari, S., Rizzardi, A., Grieco, L., et al.: ‘Security, privacy and trust in
internet of things: the road ahead’, Comput. Netw., 2015, 76, pp. 146–164
[7] Yan, Z., Zhang, P., Vasilakos, A.V.: ‘A survey on trust management for
internet of things’, J. Netw. Comput. Appl., 2014, 42, pp. 120–134
[8] Han, W., Lei, C.: ‘A survey on policy languages in network and security
management’, Comput. Netw., 2012, 56, (1), pp. 477–489, Available at http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128611003562
[9] Barker, S.: ‘The next 700 access control models or a unifying meta-model?’.
Proc. 14th ACM Symp. on Access Control Models and Technologies
(SACMAT ’09), 2009, pp. 187–196, Available at http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/1542207.1542238
[10] P. L. I. G. at W3C: ‘Review of policy languages and frameworks’. Available
at https://www.w3.org/Policy/pling/wiki/PolicyLangReview
[11] Parducci, B.: ‘Extensible access control markup language (XACML) version
3.0, standard’, 2013. Available at http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/
xacml-3.0-core-spec-os-en.html
[12] Gusmeroli, S., Piccione, S., Rotondi, D.: ‘A capability-based security
approach to manage access control in the internet of things’, Math. Comput.
Model., 2013, 58, (5/6), pp. 1189–1205
[13] Hernández-Ramos, J. L., Jara, A.J., Marın, L., et al.: ‘Distributed capability-
based access control for the internet of things’, J. Internet Serv. Inf. Secur.,
2013, 3, (3/4), pp. 1–16
[14] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., Bormann, C.: ‘The constrained application protocol
(CoAP), RFC 7252’ (RFC Editor, 2014), Available at http://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc7252.txt, accessed 19 December 2016
[15] Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, D.C.: ‘Delegated CoAP authentication
and authorization framework (DCAF)’. Internet-Draft draft-gerdes-ace-
dcafauthorize-04, Internet Engineering Task Force (October 2015), work in
Progress
[16] Park, J., Sandhu, R.: ‘The UCONABC usage control model’, ACM Trans. Inf.
Syst. Secur., 2004, 7, (1), pp. 128–174
Fig. 5  Performance analysis of a secure session establishment using
Hidra with the instances related to the four policy samples
(a) Impact of the policy length on the average delay, (b) Impact of the policy length on
the energy consumption
 
IET Inf. Secur., 2019, Vol. 13 Iss. 3, pp. 239-248
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
247
[17] Su, Z., Biennier, F.: ‘On attribute-based usage control policy ratification for
cooperative computing context’. Computing Research Repository (CoRR),
2013, abs/1305.1727
[18] Astorga, J., Jacob, E., Huarte, M., et al.: ‘Ladon: end-to-end authorisation
support for resource-deprived environments’, IET Inf. Sec., 2012, 6, (2), pp.
93–101
[19] Kim, E., Kaspar, D., Gomez, C., et al.: ‘Problem statement and requirements
for IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area network (6LoWPAN) routing’
rfc 6606 (RFC Editor, 2012), Available at https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/
rfc6606.txt, accessed 19 December 2016
[20] Kohvakka, M., Kuorilehto, M., Hännikäinen, M., et al.: ‘Performance
analysis of IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee for large-scale wireless sensor network
applications’. Proc. 3rd ACM Int. Workshop on Performance Evaluation of
Wireless Ad Hoc, Sensor and Ubiquitous Networks (PE-WASUN'06), 2006,
pp. 48–57
[21] ‘The M/G/1 System, Pollaczek Khinchin theorem’, 2005, Available at http://
www.richardclegg.org/previous/networks2/Lecture9_06.pdf
[22] Astorga, J., Jacob, E., Toledo, N., et al.: ‘Analytical evaluation of a time- and
energy-efficient security protocol for IP-enabled sensors’, Comput. Electr.
Eng., 2014, 40, (2), pp. 539–550
[23] MEMSIC's TelosB mote (TPR2420CA) datasheet. Available at http://
www.memsic.com/products/wireless-sensor-networks/wirelessmodules.html
[24] Stallings, W., Case, T.: ‘Business data communications: infrastructure,
networking, and security’ (Pearson Education Limited, 2013, 7th edn.),
chapter 2, pp. 57–84
248 IET Inf. Secur., 2019, Vol. 13 Iss. 3, pp. 239-248
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
